Survey | Summon Platform

These Parameters are specific to what types of Proposals the Stake Pool Operators (SPOs) can vote on.

Please complete each field below, giving your suggestion for the percentage of Delegated Stake to SPOs that will need to be in support of that Proposal type to have it Pass:

pvt_motion_no_confidence

Pool Voting threshold for motion of no-confidence.

pvt_committee_normal

Pool Voting threshold for new committee/threshold (normal state).

pvt_committee_no_confidence

Pool Voting threshold for new committee/threshold (state of no-confidence).

pvt_hard_fork_initiation

Pool Voting threshold for hard-fork initiation.

These Parameters are specific to what types of Proposals the Delegated Representatives (DReps) can vote on.

Below is a Pie Chart showing an example of a potential final Distribution of Registered Voting Stake on a Single Proposal. In the example, the Vote threshold to pass that Proposal is set to 51%.

Please complete each field below, giving your suggestion for the percentage of Delegated Stake to Active DReps (i.e. NOT Delegated to Auto Abstain) that will need to be in support of that Proposal type to have it Pass:

dvt_motion_no_confidence

DRep Vote threshold for motion of no-confidence.

dvt_committee_normal

DRep Vote threshold for new committee/threshold (normal state).

dvt_committee_no_confidence

DRep Vote threshold for new committee/threshold (state of no-confidence).

dvt_update_to_constitution

DRep Vote threshold for update to the Constitution.

dvt_hard_fork_initiation

DRep Vote threshold for hard-fork initiation.

dvt_p_p_network_group

DRep Vote threshold for protocol parameter changes, network group.

dvt_p_p_economic_group

DRep Vote threshold for protocol parameter changes, economic group.

dvt_p_p_technical_group

DRep Vote threshold for protocol parameter changes, technical group.

dvt_p_p_gov_group

DRep Vote threshold for protocol parameter changes, governance group.

dvt_treasury_withdrawal

DRep Vote threshold for treasury withdrawal.

These Parameters are specific to the costs within the Governance System.

Please complete each field below, giving your suggestion for the cost (in ADA) that each item should be:

gov_action_deposit

Governance action deposit (expressed in ADA).

drep_deposit

DRep deposit amount (expressed in ADA).

These Parameters are specific to the lengths of time for items within the Governance System.

Please complete each field below, giving your suggestion for the length of time (in Epochs) that each item should be:

committee_max_term_length

Constitutional committee term limits (expressed in Epochs).

gov_action_lifetime

Governance action expiration (expressed in Epochs).

drep_activity

DRep activity period (expressed in Epochs).

These Parameters are specific to establish the Constitutional Committee of Cardano:

Please complete each field below, giving your suggestion for the setting that each Constitutional Committee item should have:

committee_min_size

Minimal constitutional committee size.

Constitutional Committee Total

The proposed total number of people who should be part of the Constitutional Committee.

Constitutional Committee Threshold

The total number of Yes votes needed from Constitutional Committee members for an action to pass.

Additional Questions - Optional

This section is a wholly optional section of additional questions, that you do not have to answer if you do not wish to contribtute your thoughts.

If you would prefer to skip this section and simply submit your Parameter suggestions, already given above, feel free to click submit without filling in this section.

Additional Question 1

Currently in CIP-1694 a Governance Action Proposal will be approved upon the end of the very first epoch in which it passes the threshold of necessary Yes votes. Meaning that a Proposal can be passed before it has reached its recorded On-Chain Expiry Epoch.

Instead, should Governance Action Proposals have to run for the full length of their voting windows, i.e. until their recorded On-Chain Expiry Epoch, to account for a potential change in active voting stake?

Yes, all proposals should have to run their full term before being considered Passed, due to the always liquid nature of the CIP-1694 voting system and the potentially changing levels of support that could occur throughout the Proposal’s voting window.No, the current method is good. Proposals that pass the set Threshold of the currently active voting stake should be allowed to be considered Passed before the end of their On-Chain voting window, as this will allow them to be enacted more quickly.No, a new “Super Majority” parameter should be introduced. If Yes votes on a proposal pass the Super Majority Threshold, the Governance Action will be Passed at the end of the epoch. If No votes on a proposal pass the Super Majority Threshold the Governance Action will expire at the end of the epoch. Otherwise the proposal will run the full term before expiring and be subject to the regular Threshold for approval. This could allow for Proposals to be passed or rejected quickly if an overwhelming majority approves.

Additional Question 2

As CIP-1694 is currently written, when DReps vote on a Governance Action it must simply pass the designated threshold to be approved. That threshold is based on a given percentage of the total voting stake delegated to any DRep other than the Auto-Abstain DRep (see the Pie Chart above for a visual representation of this effect).

Abstain votes will lower the amount of Yes voting stake needed for a GA to pass the threshold. The Auto-Abstain DRep reduces the amount of Yes voting stake needed to pass a Proposal by default.

Instead, should a quorum be introduced to ensure that a minimum amount of active voting stake is delegated to DReps other than the Auto-Abstain DRep in order for the vote to be considered valid?

No, a specific quorum should not exist and the voting stake delegated to the Auto-Abstain DRep should not be considered active. ADA holders who delegate to the Auto-Abstain DRep are making a deliberate choice to not participate in Governance.Yes, a quorum should exist that prevents a Governance Action from passing unless a defined percentage of active voting stake is delegated to DReps other than the Auto-Abstain DRep, that percentage being set by a Parameter. This may prevent an extreme minority from deciding important issues for the majority of ADA held.

Additional Question 3

Currently, the Constitutional Committee has the ability to vote on threshold levels of “Motion of No Confidence” Governance Actions. Should the Constitutional Committee be allowed to vote on the thresholds of these actions?

Yes, the Constitutional Committee should have the ability to vote on these thresholds as it is their responsibility to determine if a proposed Governance Action is constitutional.No, the Constitutional Committee should not have the ability to vote on these threshold levels as these parameters affect the ability of DReps to remove CC members from power.

Note: For the signed data or transaction metadata, fields are ordered alphabetically by name, and the values are separated by commas. For example, if the values of the fields are 1, 2, 3, and 4, the signed data or transaction metadata will be: 1,2,3,4. Additional questions are named as "additional1", "additional2", "additional3", "Constitutional Committee Total" is called quorum_denominator and "Constitutional Committe Threshold" is called quorum_nominator